What Do We Learn from the Keynes vs. White Debate on the World’s Monetary System?

Imagine setting up the financial rules for the entire world after a devastating war. That’s precisely what happened in 1944 at Bretton Woods, a small town in New Hampshire. Two brilliant minds, John Maynard Keynes (representing the UK) and Harry Dexter White (representing the US), presented starkly different visions for how the global monetary system should operate.

Their debate, though decades old, offers profound lessons for today’s economic challenges. The outcome of this debate also shaped the world’s monetary system as it has been.

The Problem They Faced: Avoiding Past Mistakes

Before diving into their proposals, it’s crucial to understand what they were trying to fix. The period between World War I and World War II was marked by economic instability, competitive currency devaluations, and protectionist trade policies, all contributing to the Great Depression. The goal at Bretton Woods was to create a stable system that fostered international trade and prevented such economic catastrophes.

Keynes’s Vision: A Global Bank with a New Currency

Keynes, the renowned British economist, proposed a bold and ambitious plan. He envisioned an International Clearing Union (ICU) that would issue a new global currency called the Bancor.

The Analogies

A Global Bank Account: Think of the ICU as a massive, central bank account for all nations. When countries traded, they wouldn’t exchange pounds for dollars directly but rather use Bancor as the common currency.
The Overdrawn Account & The Savings Hoarder: If a country bought more than it sold (ran a deficit), its Bancor account would go into overdraft. If a country sold much more than it bought (ran a surplus), it would accumulate large Bancor credits.

The Key Innovation (and why it was radical)

Keynes believed that both deficit and surplus countries shared responsibility for global imbalances. To encourage balance:

Deficit countries would be charged interest on their overdrafts (like an overdraft fee).
Crucially, surplus countries would also be charged interest on their excessive Bancor holdings! This was designed to penalize “hoarding” of wealth and encourage surplus nations to spend, invest, or import more, thus stimulating global demand.

Case Study: Post-war Britain, heavily indebted, would have benefited from such a system, as it would have provided liquidity and placed some burden on creditor nations (like the US) to help rebalance the global economy. Keynes aimed for symmetrical adjustment.

White’s Vision: A Fund with Dollar at its Core

Harry Dexter White, from the powerful U.S. Treasury, proposed a more conservative and less centralized system. His plan largely reflected America’s new position as the world’s dominant economic power and largest creditor.

The Analogy

A Loan Provider: White’s proposed Stabilization Fund (which became the International Monetary Fund, or IMF) was more like a lending institution. Countries facing short-term financial difficulties could borrow from this fund, primarily in other national currencies (especially the U.S. dollar), to stabilize their exchange rates.

The Key Feature

The system would be anchored to the U.S. dollar, which would be convertible into gold at a fixed price ($35 per ounce). Other currencies would then be pegged to the dollar.
The IMF would provide conditional loans, primarily putting the burden of adjustment on the deficit countries to fix their imbalances through domestic policy changes.

Case Study: The US, holding most of the world’s gold reserves and emerging as a manufacturing powerhouse, would naturally benefit from a system where its currency was central, making international trade and investment easier for American businesses.

The Outcome: White’s Plan Prevails (Mostly)

At Bretton Woods, White’s plan largely won the day, for a simple reason: power. The U.S. was the world’s leading economic force after the war, holding the vast majority of global gold reserves. The institutions created – the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank – mirrored White’s vision more closely.

The Bretton Woods system, established in 1944, pegged other currencies to the U.S. dollar, which in turn was convertible to gold. This system provided remarkable stability and fostered global economic growth for decades.

The Unintended Consequences and Lessons for Today

However, the story doesn’t end there. The very success of Bretton Woods eventually led to its demise, and this is where the modern lessons emerge.

The Triffin Dilemma

As the world economy grew, demand for dollars (as a reserve currency) also grew. To supply these dollars, the US had to run balance of payments deficits. But running large deficits meant that eventually, the US’s gold reserves couldn’t possibly cover all the dollars held abroad. This inherent contradiction, identified by economist Robert Triffin, meant the system was unsustainable.

The Nixon Shock

By the late 1960s, the US was financing the Vietnam War and domestic programs, leading to inflation and growing trade deficits. Other countries, notably France and Germany, started demanding gold for their dollar holdings, further depleting US reserves. On August 15, 1971, President Richard Nixon unilaterally ended the dollar’s convertibility to gold. This de-anchoring effectively ended the Bretton Woods system.

The Hijacking Critique

Some argue that this move, while necessary from the US perspective, allowed the US to unilaterally print money without gold constraints. With the dollar still the world’s primary reserve currency, the US could finance its large and persistent trade deficits by issuing more dollar-denominated assets (like Treasury bonds) that other countries are willing to hold. This exorbitant privilege contributes significantly to today’s global trade imbalances, where the US often runs large deficits, and countries like China and Germany run large surpluses.

What Do We Learn?

The Dilemma of the Reserve Currency: The Triffin Dilemma shows the inherent tension in any system where a national currency serves as the global reserve. It highlights the challenges of balancing domestic policy needs with international responsibilities.
The Burden of Adjustment: Keynes’s original push for symmetrical adjustment remains highly relevant. In today’s floating exchange rate world, some argue that surplus countries still don’t face enough pressure to reduce their imbalances, contributing to global instability.
The Role of Power: The Bretton Woods outcome, and its eventual breakdown, underscore that international economic systems are not just about elegant theories but also about the geopolitical realities and economic power of nations.
No Perfect System: The debate reminds us that there is no perfect international monetary system. Each design has its strengths and weaknesses, and the “best” system often depends on the prevailing economic conditions and the political will to manage it.

The Keynes vs. White debate isn’t just a historical footnote; it’s a foundational discussion that continues to inform debates about global financial governance, trade imbalances, and the future of the international monetary system.

OCV Perspectives

Drawing on Austrian economic principles, as presented in the On Crypto Valuation (OCV) framework, the Keynes vs. White debate offers profound insights into the true nature of fiat money and, by extension, how stablecoins work. The OCV framework classifies cryptocurrencies based on the Three Utilities of Money: Store of Value, Medium of Exchange, and Unit of Account.

1. The True Nature of Fiat Money from an OCV Perspective:

The Austrian School of Economics emphasizes that money should arise spontaneously in a free market through individual action, rather than being created by government decree. Carl Menger’s theory of money’s origin highlights how commodities with high marketability naturally become money.

Deviation from Spontaneous Order: The Bretton Woods system, and especially its post-1971 form, represents a significant deviation from this spontaneous order. White’s plan, which largely prevailed, established the U.S. dollar as the central anchor, with other currencies pegged to it, and initially convertible to gold. However, the Nixon Shock in 1971 unilaterally ended the dollar’s convertibility to gold, effectively transforming it into a pure fiat currency. This meant the dollar’s value was no longer backed by a physical commodity but by government decree and trust.
Impact on Utilities: From an OCV perspective, this transformation profoundly impacts the money’s utilities. While fiat currencies, enforced by nation-states, continue to serve as a Medium of Exchange and Unit of Account within their respective economies and globally, their function as a Store of Value becomes inherently less reliable. The Austrian principle of the non-neutrality of money states that changes in the money supply (e.g., through government printing or central bank policy) do not affect all prices uniformly but distort relative prices and resource allocation, leading to inflation and eroding purchasing power. This contrasts with Bitcoin, which is often analyzed as a digital gold emphasizing its scarcity and potential to preserve purchasing power over time, aligning with the Austrian focus on gold’s store of value utility.
Centralized Control and Critique: The hijacking critique of the Nixon shock, suggesting the US could unilaterally print money without gold constraints, aligns with the broader Austrian skepticism toward centralized financial systems and government intervention. This exorbitant privilege of the reserve currency issuer, as highlighted by the Triffin Dilemma, allows for the financing of large deficits, which can lead to global imbalances and instability. This illustrates how the post-Bretton Woods fiat system, while providing stability for a time, fundamentally altered money’s nature away from market-driven principles towards state control.

2. How Stablecoins Work (as a Medium of Exchange)

The OCV framework directly addresses stablecoins by discussing them as fulfilling the Medium of Exchange utility.

Addressing Volatility: Stablecoins are designed to address the inherent volatility of many cryptocurrencies, making them suitable for transactions. They achieve this stability by being pegged to traditional fiat money, primarily the U.S. dollar, which has been enforced by nation states.
Leveraging Fiat’s Utility: In essence, stablecoins leverage the established unit of account and medium of exchange functions of existing fiat currencies. By maintaining a stable value relative to a fiat currency (e.g., 1 USD Coin (USDC) equals 1 U.S. dollar), stablecoins provide a bridge between the volatile crypto ecosystem and the stability of traditional finance. They allow for the efficient exchange of value within decentralized finance (DeFi) and other Web3 applications, mirroring the transactional utility of fiat money.
Inheriting Fiat’s Characteristics: Therefore, stablecoins, while operating on decentralized blockchain networks, derive their core functionality and stability from the very fiat monetary system that emerged from the Bretton Woods outcome and its subsequent evolution. They adopt the primary utility of fiat money as a medium of exchange, facilitating transactions and economic calculation within crypto ecosystems, but they also inherently carry the characteristics and potential vulnerabilities of the fiat currencies they are pegged to, especially concerning their long-term store of value. OCV’s emphasis on classifying cryptocurrencies based on their primary utility helps distinguish how stablecoins, despite being digital assets, fundamentally operate by mirroring the transactional role of traditional fiat.

Appendix

Boughton, J. M. (2001). The Case for the IMF: A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods Era. International Monetary Fund.
Steil, B. (2013). The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order. Princeton University Press.
Eichengreen, B. (1992). Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939. Oxford University Press.
Triffin, R. (1960). Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility. Yale University Press.

我们能从凯恩斯与怀特的世界货币体系辩论中学到什么？

想象一下，在一场毁灭性的战争之后，为整个世界制定金融规则。这正是 1944 年在新罕布什尔州小镇布雷顿森林发生的事情。两位杰出的思想家，约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯（John Maynard Keynes，代表英国）和小哈里·德克斯特·怀特（Harry Dexter White，代表美国），就全球货币体系应如何运作提出了截然不同的愿景。

他们的辩论，尽管已过去几十年，却为当今的经济挑战提供了深刻的教训。这场辩论的结果也塑造了现今的世界货币体系。

他们面临的问题：避免重蹈覆辙

在深入探讨他们的提案之前，了解他们试图解决什么问题至关重要。两次世界大战之间的时期充满了经济不稳定、竞争性货币贬值和保护主义贸易政策，所有这些都导致了大萧条（Great Depression）。布雷顿森林会议的目标是建立一个稳定的体系，促进国际贸易并防止此类经济灾难。

凯恩斯的愿景：一个拥有新货币的全球银行

英国著名经济学家凯恩斯提出了一项大胆而雄心勃勃的计划。他设想建立一个国际清算联盟（International Clearing Union，ICU），发行一种名为 「班科尔」（Bancor）的新全球货币。

类比

一个全球银行账户：将 ICU 想象成所有国家的一个庞大的中央银行账户。当各国进行贸易时，它们不会直接用英镑兑换美元，而是使用 Bancor 作为共同货币。
透支账户与储蓄囤积者：如果一个国家购买的商品多于出售的商品（出现赤字），其 Bancor 账户就会透支。如果一个国家出售的商品远多于购买的商品（出现盈余），它就会积累大量的 Bancor 信用。

关键创新（以及它为何激进）

凯恩斯认为，赤字国和盈余国都对全球失衡负有责任。为了鼓励平衡：

赤字国将为其透支支付利息（就像透支费）。
至关重要的是，盈余国也将为其过多的 Bancor 持有量支付利息！ 这样做是为了惩罚财富的「囤积」，并鼓励盈余国家消费、投资或进口更多商品，从而刺激全球需求。

具体案例：饱受债务困扰的战后英国将受益于这样一个体系，因为它将提供流动性，并使债权国（如美国）承担部分帮助全球经济再平衡的责任。凯恩斯的目标是对称调整。

怀特的愿景：一个以美元为核心的基金

来自强大的美国财政部的哈里·德克斯特·怀特（Harry Dexter White）提出了一个更保守、更不集中的体系。他的计划很大程度上反映了美国作为世界主导经济强国和最大债权国的新地位。

类比

一个贷款提供者：怀特提议的稳定基金（后来成为国际货币基金组织，即 IMF）更像一个贷款机构。面临短期金融困难的国家可以从该基金借款，主要是借入其他国家货币（尤其是美元），以稳定其汇率。

关键特征

该体系将锚定美元（U.S. dollar），美元将以固定价格（每盎司 35 美元）兑换黄金。其他货币则盯住美元。
国际货币基金组织（IMF）将提供有条件的贷款，主要将调整的负担放在赤字国家，要求它们通过国内政策改革来纠正失衡。

具体案例：美国，拥有世界上大部分的黄金储备，并作为制造业强国崛起，自然会受益于一个以其货币为核心的体系，这使得美国企业进行国际贸易和投资更为便捷。

结果：怀特计划（多数投票）胜出

在布雷顿森林会议（Bretton Woods）上，怀特的计划在很大程度上赢得了胜利，原因很简单：实力。美国在战后是世界领先的经济力量，拥有全球绝大多数的黄金储备。所创建的机构——国际货币基金组织（IMF）和世界银行（World Bank）——更接近怀特的愿景。

1944 年建立的布雷顿森林体系（Bretton Woods system），将其他货币盯住美元，而美元又可兑换黄金。这个体系在几十年里提供了显著的稳定性，并促进了全球经济增长。

意想不到的后果和对今天的启示

然而，故事并未就此结束。布雷顿森林体系的成功最终导致了它的瓦解，而这正是现代教训的来源。

特里芬困境

随着世界经济的增长，对美元（作为储备货币）的需求也随之增长。为了供应这些美元，美国不得不出现国际收支逆差。但出现巨额逆差意味着，最终美国的黄金储备根本无法覆盖所有海外持有的美元。经济学家罗伯特·特里芬（Robert Triffin）指出的这种内在矛盾意味着该体系是不可持续的。

尼克松冲击

到 20 世纪 60 年代末，美国正在为越南战争和国内项目提供资金，导致通货膨胀和贸易逆差不断扩大。其他国家，特别是法国和德国，开始要求用美元兑换黄金，进一步耗尽了美国的储备。1971 年 8 月 15 日，理查德·尼克松（Richard Nixon）总统单方面中止了美元兑换黄金的承诺。这种脱钩实际上结束了布雷顿森林体系。

劫持批判

一些人认为，尽管此举从美国角度来看是必要的，但它允许美国在不受黄金限制的情况下单方面印钞。由于美元仍然是世界主要的储备货币，美国可以通过发行更多美元计价的资产（如美国国债）来为其巨额且持续的贸易逆差融资，而其他国家愿意持有这些资产。这种**「嚣张的特权」**（exorbitant privilege）极大地导致了当今的全球贸易失衡，即美国经常出现巨额逆差，而中国和德国等国家则出现巨额顺差。

我们学到了什么？

储备货币的困境：特里芬困境（Triffin Dilemma）揭示了任何国家货币充当全球储备的体系中固有的紧张关系。它凸显了平衡国内政策需求与国际责任的挑战。
调整的负担：凯恩斯最初对对称调整（symmetrical adjustment）的推动至今仍具高度相关性。在当今的浮动汇率世界中，一些人认为盈余国家仍然没有面临足够的压力来减少其失衡，从而导致全球不稳定。
权力作用：布雷顿森林体系的结果及其最终崩溃强调，国际经济体系不仅仅关乎优美的理论，还关乎地缘政治现实和国家的经济实力。
没有完美的体系：这场辩论提醒我们，没有完美的国际货币体系。每种设计都有其优点和缺点，而「最佳」体系往往取决于当前的经济状况和管理它的政治意愿。

凯恩斯与怀特的辩论不仅仅是一个历史注脚；它是一个基础性的讨论，持续为关于全球金融治理、贸易失衡和国际货币体系未来的辩论提供信息。

OCV 视角

借鉴奥地利经济学原理，正如加密货币估值（On Crypto Valuation，OCV）框架所呈现的，凯恩斯与怀特之争为法币的真实性质（fiat money）以及稳定币（stablecoins）如何运作提供了深刻见解。OCV 框架根据货币的三种效用：价值储存（Store of Value）、交换媒介（Medium of Exchange）和记账单位（Unit of Account）对加密货币进行分类。

1. 从 OCV 视角看法币的真实性质

奥地利经济学派（Austrian School of Economics）强调，货币应通过个体行为在自由市场中自发产生，而不是由政府法令创造。卡尔·门格尔（Carl Menger）的货币起源理论强调了市场流动性高的商品如何自然成为货币。

偏离自发秩序：布雷顿森林体系，尤其是其 1971 年后的形式，代表着对这种自发秩序的重大偏离。怀特的计划（在很大程度上得以实施）确立了美元作为核心锚定货币，其他货币与之挂钩，并最初可兑换黄金。然而，1971 年的尼克松冲击单方面终止了美元与黄金的兑换，有效地将其转变为一种纯粹的法币。这意味着美元的价值不再由实物商品支撑，而是由政府法令与信任维系。
对货币效用的影响：从 OCV 的角度看，这种转变深刻影响了货币的效用。尽管由民族国家强制执行的法币在各自经济体和全球范围内继续充当交换媒介和记账单位，但其作为价值储存的功能本质上变得不那么可靠。奥地利学派的货币非中性原则（non-neutrality of money）指出，货币供应量的变化（例如通过政府印钞或中央银行政策）并非均匀地影响所有价格，而是扭曲相对价格和资源配置，导致通货膨胀和购买力侵蚀。这与比特币（Bitcoin）形成对比，比特币通常被分析为一种数字黄金，强调其稀缺性和随时间保存购买力的潜力，这与奥地利学派对黄金价值储存效用的关注相符。
中心化控制与批判：对尼克松冲击的「劫持」批判，即美国可以在没有黄金限制的情况下单方面印钞，与奥地利学派对中心化金融体系和政府干预的广泛怀疑是一致的。特里芬困境所强调的储备货币发行方的这种「嚣张的特权」，允许巨额赤字融资，这可能导致全球失衡和不稳定。这表明后布雷顿森林体系的法币体系，尽管在一段时间内提供了稳定性，但从根本上将货币的性质从市场驱动原则转向了国家控制。

2. 稳定币如何运作（作为交换媒介）

OCV 框架通过讨论稳定币如何实现交换媒介的效用来直接阐述它们。

解决波动性：稳定币旨在解决许多加密货币固有的波动性，使其适用于交易。它们通过与传统法币（主要是美元，由民族国家强制执行）挂钩来实现这种稳定性。
利用法币的效用：本质上，稳定币利用了现有法币既定的记账单位和交换媒介功能。通过维持与法币的稳定价值关系（例如，1 USDC (USD Coin) 等于 1 美元），稳定币在波动的加密生态系统与传统金融的稳定性之间搭建了一座桥梁。它们允许在去中心化金融（DeFi）和其他 Web3 应用程序中高效地交换价值，这反映了法币的交易效用。
继承法币特征：因此，稳定币，虽然运行在去中心化的区块链网络上，但其核心功能和稳定性源于布雷顿森林体系的结果及其后续演变所形成的法币体系。它们采纳了法币作为交换媒介的主要效用，促进了加密生态系统内的交易和经济核算，但它们也固有地承载着它们所挂钩的法币的特性和潜在脆弱性，尤其是在其长期价值储存方面。OCV 对加密货币主要效用分类的强调有助于区分稳定币，尽管它们是数字资产，但其根本运作方式是模仿传统法币的交易角色。

附录

Boughton, J. M. (2001). The Case for the IMF: A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods Era. International Monetary Fund.
Steil, B. (2013). The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order. Princeton University Press.
Eichengreen, B. (1992). Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939. Oxford University Press.
Triffin, R. (1960). Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility. Yale University Press.